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As society has embraced technology and systems to promote services, trade and ubiquitous commu-
nication, it has also inadvertently exposed itself to a plethora of security risks. One of the most significant
of these risks is that of insider threat, where privileged insiders (be they employees or trusted third-
parties) within an enterprise, intentionally or inadvertently cause harm their organisations [1]. While the
topic of insider threat has been examined and researched for decades [2, 3], the problem still persists, and
some would even argue that it is becoming worse [4]. Could this be the result of a disconnect between
approaches and solutions being researched and those that are (or can be) actually implemented?
In this special issue titled, “Insider Threat Solutions: Moving from Concept to Reality”, we focus on
novel systems to tackle insider threat which also provide a clear path for how they can be deployed in
organisations. Our aim is to help bridge the gap between research concepts and the reality that businesses
face day-to-day as they seek to prevent, detect and respond to insider attacks. This special issue includes
four papers that outline novel and practical approaches to addressing the insider threat challenge. They
focus on various solution perspectives, from multi-policy access control systems to formal approaches
for network security policy validation. These best papers are selected from articles submitted to, and
presented in, the 8th International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST) [3] which
was held in Conjunction with ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
2016 at the Hofburg Palace, Vienna, Austria, on October 24-28, 2016.
The first article, “Linear Time Algorithms to Restrict Insider Access using Multi-Policy Access Con-
trol Systems” [5], discusses an implementation of the Next Generation Access Control (NGAC) standard
from the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The main contributions of their research are: (a)
being the first ever study to demonstrate the scalability of the NGAC multi-policy access control system;
(b) the creation of a novel visualization approach to enable review of user object access on NGAC sys-
tems; and (c) the definition of linear time algorithms for performing access control decisions and review
of user access rights.
In the second article, “Formalising Policies for Insider-threat Detection: A Tripwire Grammar” [6],
the authors describe their recent research into how they intend to enhance anomaly detection systems
by capturing actions of concern. They view concerning actions as something that they can design and
implement tripwires within a system to detect. The aim, therefore, being to orchestrate these tripwires in
conjunction with an anomaly detection system to better detect insider attacks. Overall, their work seeks
to provide a single framework for unambiguously capturing tripwires, alongside a library of existing
ones in use. Therefore, tripwires may be used to map experiences regardless of the heterogeneity of the
security tools and practices deployed.
The third article, “Insider Threats and Auctions: Formalization, Mechanized Proof, and Code Gen-
eration” [7], applies machine assisted formal methods to explore insider threats for auctions. The contri-
butions of the paper are: (a) a formalization of the cocaine protocol using Isabelle’s inductive approach
including the formalization and proof of the absence of the sweetheart deal and the impossibility of
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excluding collusion of insiders; (b) the extension of the inductive approach to auctions by expressing
arbitrary numbers of rounds, broadcast messages, an anonymity layer, and by merging with the Isabelle
insider framework; (c) a practical solution by defining a constructive test predicate that implements the
protocol, applying the code generation mechanism of Isabelle to generate Scala code from that, and
proving correctness of the test predicate with respect to the specification within Isabelle.
The final article, “A formal approach for network security policy validation” [8], proposes a novel
approach for validating network policy enforcement, by checking the network status and configuration,
and detection of the possible causes in case of misconfiguration or software attacks. The authors’ contri-
bution exploits formal methods to model and validate the packet processing and forwarding behaviour of
security controls, and to validate the trustworthiness of the controls by using remote attestation. Finally,
they propose a prototype implementation of their approach to validate different scenarios.
We would like to express our sincere appreciation of the contributions made by all the authors and
our deep gratitude to all reviewers who have carefully analysed the assigned papers and contributed to
improve their quality. Our special thanks go to Prof. Ilsun You, Editor in Chief of the JoWUA for his
invaluable support throughout this special issue preparation.
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